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U.S. COURTS, THE DEATH PENALTY, AND THE
DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY: ENFORCEMENT IN
THE HEART OF DARKNESS
Speedy Rice* & Renee Luke**
The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not there-
fore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for viola-
tions of the criminal laws of the United States.
-Chief Justice Rehnquist in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain'
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following hypothetical. Carlos Pravia, a
Mexican national, breaks into a home in Dallas, Texas, as-
saults two people inside, and then steals their belongings. He
flees to Monterrey, Mexico. In Texas, the grand jury indicts
Pravia for burglary and assault. The United States requests
his extradition from Mexico based only on these charges.
Mexico consents. Before the indictment was issued, however,
the prosecutor had reason to believe that Carlos Pravia was
involved in another break-in that resulted in a murder. Hav-
ing already experienced Mexico's requirement of an assurance
of no death penalty before approving an extradition, the
prosecutor does not take any steps to pursue the criminal
connection.
After Mexico extradites Mr. Pravia to Dallas, the prose-
cutor picks up the investigation of the earlier break-in and
* Professor at Gonzaga University School of Law; Director and Founder of
International Criminal Justice Law Clinic at Gonzaga University School of Law;
Chair of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers International
Affairs Committee. J.D., California Western School of Law; B.A., Furman Uni-
versity.
** Third Year Law Student and Research Assistant, Gonzaga University
School of Law; B.A., University of Colorado.
1. 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
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murder, arguing that newly discovered evidence proves Car-
los Pravia committed both crimes. In a separate indictment,
the prosecutor charges Carlos Pravia with capital murder. In
addition to these changes, the prosecutor also discovers Mr.
Pravia is involved in drug trafficking. The prosecutor amends
the first indictment to add various drug trafficking charges.
Mr. Pravia argues he cannot be prosecuted for murder and
drug trafficking under the doctrine of specialty because he
was not extradited for those charges. Mexico consents to the
drug trafficking charge, but argues the United States may not
seek the death penalty for the murder charge, as the death
penalty is unconstitutional in Mexico and under no circum-
stances would it have extradited Carlos Pravia without an as-
surance of no death penalty.
What is the United States required to do in such a cir-
cumstance? What should a foreign government that has re-
jected capital punishment realistically expect from the multi-
sovereign U.S. system of justice when faced with an extradi-
tion request from a state or the federal government of the
United States? What steps can the foreign government take
to protect its national policies and international interests in
such circumstances?
Foreign governments must understand the general aver-
sion in American jurisprudence to apply international law,
even when such a decision flies in the face of formal extradi-
tion treaties and international norms. For example, only a
very small number of cases have acknowledged the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, a document the United
States voluntarily ratified.! No more than a handful of cases
have affirmatively applied the doctrine of specialty, which
would bar a charge that was different than the one for which
the defendant had been extradited. This opposition to inter-
national principles is especially worrisome when an extra-
dited defendant faces a new charge in the United States for
which he could receive the death penalty.
This article will analyze the application of the doctrine of
specialty in international extradition proceedings, with spe-
cial emphasis on cases involving the death penalty. The arti-
cle first gives a brief description of extradition and the doc-
2. See Douglass W. Cassel, Ignoring the World Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Jan. 10, 2002, at 6.
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trine of specialty.3 Second, it examines the details of the doc-
trine of specialty that pose the greatest problems in courts in
the United States. Third, the article briefly explores the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations, and its treatment by
U.S. courts as a predictor of how the doctrine of specialty will
be handled by U.S. courts. Finally, it shows what foreign
governments can and should do before agreeing to any extra-
dition request.
II. EXTRADITION-AN OVERVIEW
"Extradition is 'the surrender by one nation to another of
an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its
own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the
other, which, being competent to try and punish him, de-
mands the surrender."'4 The rationale underlying extradition
is the facilitation of capturing fugitives outside the country's
jurisdiction.5 Extradition is generally carried out through an
extradition treaty, which is essentially a mutual agreement
between two governments to promote the prosecution of an
accused.6 On an international level, "[tireaties may provide
for the rendition of criminal fugitives between states, but it is
for [provincial] law to determine whether the fugitive is to be
surrendered in accordance with the extradition treaty."7 A
government must present evidence of probable cause in order
to extradite and try an individual.8
In the United States, there are five substantive require-
ments that must be satisfied for extradition to and from the
United States: (1) reciprocity;9 (2) double criminality;1" (3) an
3. See infra Parts II, III.A.
4. United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
585 (6th ed. 1991) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 et seq.).
5. Timothy McMichael, Note, Born To Run: The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington's Misapplication of the Doctrine of Specialty in State v. Pang, 74 WASH.
L. REV. 191, 212 (1999).
6. See Puentes, 50 F.3d at 1572 (citing 1 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 359-60 (2d rev. ed. 1987)).
7. John Dugard & Christine Van Den Wyngert, Reconciling Extradition
With Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 188 (1998).
8. See Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 476(1)(a) (1987)).
9. Reciprocity "essentially requires that either (a) the states involved in an
extradition reciprocally recognize their respective judicial processes, or (b)
2002] 1063
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extraditable offense;" (4) non-inquiry; 12 and (5) specialty."
This article will concentrate on the fifth, and perhaps most
controversial, requirement-the doctrine of specialty.
III. DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY
A. A General Overview of the Doctrine of Specialty
The United States Supreme Court created the doctrine of
specialty more than a century ago in United States v.
Rauscher.4 In Rauscher, the defendant was convicted of
murder and was extradited pursuant to a formal extradition
treaty." Murder was the only extraditable charge." After the
defendant was extradited, however, he was charged with
"cruel and unusual punishment."' The court held it was un-
reasonable to allow the requesting country to prosecute the
extradited defendant "without any limitation, implied or oth-
erwise."" If a surrendering country is not able to limit the ex-
tradition charges, it would undermine the requirement that
an extradition request state with particularity the charge
symmetry exists between the judicial processes of each state." Hugh Thatcher,
Note, The Doctrine of Specialty: An Argument for a More Restrictive Rauscher
Interpretation After State v. Pang, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1321, 1331-32
(1998).
10. "Double criminality requires the offenses for which extradition is re-
quested be a crime in both the requested and requesting states." Id. at 1332.
11. "The extraditable offense requirement necessitates either (1) that the
offense be specifically listed in the extradition treaty, or (2) that the offense falls
within the definition of an extraditable offense as created by a formula set forth
in the extradition treaty." Id.
12. Hugh Thatcher states the following:
The duty of non-inquiry is placed upon U.S. courts when considering an
extradition request from another state. The court may not inquire into
the procedures used by the requesting state to obtain probable cause
for extradition, question the means by which a criminal conviction is
obtained under the system of the requesting state, or inquire about the
penalty that the relator will be subject to upon conviction.
Id.
13. The doctrine of specialty mandates that an extradited defendant "shall
be tried only for the offense with which he is charged in the extradition proceed-
ings, and for which he was delivered up." United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407, 424 (1886).
14. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
15. See id. at 410, 418-19.
16. See id. at 409-10.
17. Id. at 409.
18. Id. at 419-20.
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upon which the defendant is to be extradited. 9 The Rauscher
Court held that an accused
shall be tried only for the offense with which he is charged
in the extradition proceedings and for which he was deliv-
ered up; and that if not tried for that, or after trial and ac-
quittal, he shall have a reasonable time to leave the coun-
try before he is arrested upon a charge of any other crime
committed previous to his extradition.
0
This provision is typically integrated into extradition
treaties. The countries entering into such a treaty may
choose to either narrow or broaden the protection afforded an
accused, as they choose.2 Thus, it is imperative to analyze
the plain language of the pertinent treaty to determine the
amount of protection the doctrine provides an extradited de-
fendant.2
This Rauscher principle has since been labeled the doc-
trine of specialty. The name comes from the legal term "spe-
cialty," meaning "[a] contract under seal." 4 The specialty
provision in an extradition treaty is a sealed agreement be-
tween two countries; it ensures that the charges upon which
the extradition was based will not waiver. The doctrine is
now implicitly recognized by federal statute. 5
The three goals of the doctrine of specialty are (1) "to pro-
tect the sovereignty of the surrendering country by stopping
the indiscriminate prosecution of an individual for crimes
separate and unrelated to the extradition request;"26 (2) in-
19. See id. at 421.
20. Id. at 424.
21. See, e.g., McMichael, supra note 5, at 211.
22. United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
23. See In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 993 (E.D. Cal. 2001)
(citing United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1993)); United
States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Puentes, 50
F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Siriprechapong, 181 F.R.D.
416, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (6th ed. 1991).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (2000) (stating a defendant extradited from the
United States is "to be tried for the offense of which charged."); 18 U.S.C. § 3192
(stating an accused person extradited to the United States shall be protected
"until the final conclusion of his trial for the offenses specified in the warrant of
extradition .... ").
26. McMichael, supra note 5, at 210; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY §
477 (1987); see also United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1300 (3d Cir. 1991)
(citing United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 720 (11th Cir. 1989)).
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ternational comity;27 and (3) "to protect the interests of the ex-
tradited individual.
2 8
First, the doctrine protects the surrendering country. "A
state using the doctrine of specialty can condition its discre-
tion to extradite based on concrete requirements, ensuring
that the policies supporting extradition are satisfied in a
manner that is consistent with both the state's legal para-
digm and any necessary political considerations. 29  For ex-
ample, if the death penalty is unconstitutional in the surren-
dering country, that country may elect to limit extradition to
only non-capital offenses. Such extradition assurances serve
to protect the laws and fundamental principles of the surren-
dering country.
Second, the doctrine of specialty encourages international
comity. If the requesting country ignores the doctrine of spe-
cialty, it will fall under scrutiny from the international com-
munity. For instance, international courts have begun to in-
tervene in cases in the United States, especially those that
involve the death penalty.2 0 Some international treaties con-
dition membership on the ratification and compliance with
like doctrines.3' These are all mechanisms by which the in-
ternational community can police countries that choose to ig-
nore treaties or international legal principles such as the doc-
trine of specialty.
Third, the doctrine protects the extradited individual.
"The doctrine of specialty is designed to prevent prosecution
27. See United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983); see also United
States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991); Blair v. United States,
No. 91-55057, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17742 (9th Cir. June 2, 1992); Gallo-
Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Na-
john, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986).
28. See McMichael, supra note 5, at 211.
29. See Thatcher, supra note 9, at 1333.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. For example,
The Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly passed a resolu-
tion late Monday saying the two countries should be removed as ob-
servers at the 43-nation organization unless they make "significant
progress" on abolishing executions by Jan. 1, 2003.
The abolition of capital punishment has been a condition for full
membership in the Council of Europe since 1994. The United States,
Japan, Mexico and Canada have been observers since 1996.
Council of Europe Demands U.S., Japan Abolish Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 26, 2001. For additional source, see the Death Penalty Information
Center's Web site at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html.
[Vol. 421066
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for an offense for which the person would not have been ex-
tradited or to prevent punishment in excess of what the re-
quested state had reason to believe was contemplated."32 The
doctrine guarantees the "integrity of the extradition process,"
as a country may not request extradition under false pre-
tenses and later charge the defendant with a different, and
possibly more severe, crime.33 The goal of protecting the
rights of the extradited defendant, however, is often under-
mined by provisions in extradition treaties that permit the
surrendering country to waive the doctrine.34 This problem
will be addressed in the following section.
B. Post-Rauscher Cases
Case law following Rauscher is erratic, contradictory, and
oftentimes dismissive of international law. The decisions re-
veal, among other things, the misunderstandings surround-
ing the doctrine, the inherent complications in extradition
proceedings, and sadly, the general aversion of the United
States to comply with international law.
In general, cases since Rauscher have diluted the Court's
holding. Rauscher established the general principle that an
extradited defendant may not be prosecuted for an offense dif-
ferent from the one for which he was extradited. 5 Yet, the
doctrine of specialty set forth in the Rauscher opinion raises
several questions that subsequent courts have struggled to
answer. Does the doctrine of specialty apply only to cases in-
volving formal extradition? What tests do (or should) courts
use to determine whether the doctrine of specialty has been
violated? Does a defendant automatically have standing to
claim a violation of the doctrine of specialty? And finally, can
a country waive the doctrine of specialty? This section will
address each of these questions.
1. Does the Doctrine of Specialty Depend on Formal
Extradition?
Federal courts are split on this question. Some have
ruled that the doctrine of specialty is only applicable where
32. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 48] (2d Cir. 1972).
33. Thatcher, supra note 9, at 1333.
34. See Dugard & Van Den Wyngert, supra note 7, at 188.
35. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 421 (1886).
106720021
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there has been a formal extradition. 6 Others have main-
tained any legal transportation of an accused from a foreign
country-even kidnapping by the requesting country-is suf-
ficient to bring the doctrine into play." Courts that do not
limit the doctrine to formal extradition under a treaty usually
invoke terms such as "international comity." 8
a. Rauscher and Its Progeny
The doctrine of specialty enunciated in Rauscher was fac-
tually limited to extradition pursuant to a formal treaty-not
extradition based solely on international comity. In making
this distinction, the Rauscher Court invoked the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.39 It held that ex-
tradition based solely on international comity, while possible,
"has never been recognized as among those obligations of one
government towards another."'
The United States Supreme Court has limited Rauscher
in other decisions applying the doctrine of specialty. On the
very day it decided Rauscher, the Supreme Court also decided
Ker v. Illinois." In Ker, the defendant was indicted in the
United States for larceny." The defendant, who was living in
Peru at the time of the indictment, was kidnapped and forci-
bly transferred to the United States." The kidnapping was
not government-sponsored because the kidnapper was not
acting pursuant to an extradition treaty; Peru did not object
to the kidnapping or prosecution." The Ker Court distin-
guished Rauscher:
If Ker had been brought to this country by proceedings
under the treaty... with Peru, it seems probable... that
he might have successfully pleaded [under the doctrine of
specialty] that he was extradited for larceny, and con-
36. See, e.g., id.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1988).
38. See id. Comity is defined as "courts of one state or jurisdiction will give
effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a
matter of obligations but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1991) (citing Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d
689, 695 (1977)).
39. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419.
40. Id. at 236.
41. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
42. See id. at 437-38.
43. See id.
44. See id.
1068 [Vol. 42
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victed by the verdict of a jury of embezzlement .... But it
is quite a different case when the plaintiff in error comes
to this country [by manner of a kidnapping], clothed with
no rights which a proceeding under the treaty could have
given him, and no duty which this country owes to Peru or
to him under the treaty.
45
Later cases, however, chose to adopt the narrow view implicit
in Ker rather than the broader Rauscher view. One such case
held that extradition based on international comity does not
invoke the doctrine of specialty.46
Similar decisions have refused to apply the doctrine of
specialty to cases where there was no formal, specific extradi-
tion request.4 In United States v. Trujillo, English officials
deported the defendant from England to his native Colom-
bia.48  During the transport, he was routed through the
United States.49 When he entered the United States, he was
arrested on another charge separate from the one for which
he was removed from England. The Court held that because
he was not extradited to the United States, the doctrine of
specialty did not apply to the charges he faced in the United
States.50 Unfortunately, many courts are following this trend;
they are using this distinction as an excuse to avoid the doc-
trine of specialty.51
b. Beyond the Bounds of Rauscher
In a more recent decision, the Court held the doctrine of
specialty does not apply in cases where the defendant is
brought to the United States by forcible government-
sponsored kidnapping." In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
the defendant was a Mexican doctor who was indicted for the
kidnapping and murder of a United States Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") special agent.53 After the indictment,
DEA agents abducted the defendant from Mexico and flew
45. Id. at 443.
46. See United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 871 F. Supp. 215 (D. Del. 1994).
48. See id. at 219.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659-60
(1992).
52. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 659-60.
53. See id. at 657.
10692002]
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him on a private plane to Texas, where he was arrested and
formally charged.
5 4
The Alvarez-Machain Court held that the United States
had jurisdiction, irrespective of the fact that such jurisdiction
arose as a result of a government-sponsored kidnapping.5 It
distinguished Rauscher because Mr. Alvarez-Machain was
not before the court by virtue of a treaty, but rather as a re-
sult of a forcible kidnapping. 6 It held that absent language in
an extradition treaty prohibiting forcible abduction by the
United States for the purpose of criminal prosecution, courts
have jurisdiction to try individuals abducted from another
country. 7
The Court followed Ker and held that the defendant was
not entitled to rights such as the doctrine of specialty, as he
would have been if he had been extradited pursuant to a for-
mal extradition treaty.58 It found that the factual differences
in Ker-such as the fact that the kidnapping was not govern-
ment-sponsored and the surrendering country did not object
to the kidnapping or prosecution-were irrelevant. 9  It
adopted Ker and held that a government-sponsored abduction
does not deprive the kidnapped defendant of liberty without
due process of law, nor does it limit jurisdiction of courts of
the kidnapping country, even considering the objections of the
offended country. °
As Alvarez-Machain demonstrates, the United States is
increasingly resorting to subterfuge, deceit and kidnapping,
rather than international law norms and formal extradition,
to bring foreign nationals under the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. Law enforcement agencies know that bringing a de-
fendant into a U.S. jurisdiction using such methods is the
surest way to avoid the complications and limitations of for-
mal extradition. After Alvarez-Machain, U.S. courts likely
will deny the seized individuals rights they would have had if
they had been formally extradited. The lack of protection of
constitutional rights and disrespect for international law en-
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 659-60.
57. See id. at 664-70.
58. See id. at 659-62.
59. See id. at 662.
60. See id.
1070 [Vol. 42
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courages prosecutors and law enforcement personnel to ig-
nore formal extradition treaties. In so doing, the United
States violates international law on many levels.
c. The Individual Rights Position
A few cases have taken a more encompassing view of
Rauscher, holding that "[tlhe rule of specialty is a general
rule of international law that applies with equal force regard-
less of whether extradition occurs by treaty or comity."6' The
Kaufman court specifically held that a court need not deter-
mine whether a defendant was extradited, deported, or just
"kicked out" from the surrendering country. 2 Kaufman fol-
lowed the rule set out in Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the
United States,63 that the doctrine of specialty applies regard-
less of whether the extradition was based on international
comity or a formal extradition treaty: regardless of the basis
for extradition, the purpose remains always to protect the
surrendering nation from a breach by the requesting nation.'
This rule is based on the concept that "[tihe 'principle of spe-
cialty' reflects a fundamental concern of governments that
persons who are surrendered should not be subject to indis-
criminate prosecution by the receiving government, especially
for political crimes."65
This flux in case law is reflective of both the general mis-
understanding of the doctrine of specialty, and a reluctance to
abide by international agreements. The Rauscher Court, in
first developing the doctrine of specialty in 1886, could not
have anticipated every scenario possible in today's world of
international law. Hence, the Rauscher opinion should be
analyzed with regard to its time period and the realities of
modern day communications, travel and diplomacy. It is now
easy and fast to fly defendants between countries. U.S. law
enforcement personnel can be in and out of any country in the
world with speed and relative impunity. The distinctions in
how transfers can now be accomplished should not serve as a
tool to trump the individual rights of the extradited defen-
dant that were intended by the Rauscher decision.
61. United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1007 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 1007.
63. 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.1972).
64. Id. at 479-80.
65. Id. at 481.
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d. An International Perspective
As the U.S. federal courts turn away from honoring in-
ternational norms, international decisions are becoming more
focused on the need to enforce the doctrine of specialty. In
United States v. Bin Laden,66 defendant Mohamed was de-
ported from South Africa to the United States. The South Af-
rican government unconditionally consented to the deporta-
tion notwithstanding the fact that the death penalty is
unconstitutional in South Africa." There was some evidence
that the South African government acceded to the uncondi-
tional deportation under intense pressure from the United
States and its agents in South Africa. 8 The South African
Constitutional Court issued an opinion finding that the South
African government erred when it did not condition Mo-
hamed's deportation on the assurance from the United States
that he would not be executed." The court held that whether
Mohamed was deported or extradited was irrelevant." Nor
did it matter that Mohamed consented to the deportation be-
cause he was not fully apprised of his rights under the South
African Constitution.7 Regardless of whether the defendant
was deported or officially extradited, "Mohamed's removal to
the United States should have been conditioned on a com-
mitment by the United States not to seek or impose the death
penalty.""
The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York chose to ignore the opinion of the South Af-
rican Constitutional Court as a basis to strike the death no-
tice. The United States should cease using distinctions
between extraditions and deportation, and worse yet, kidnap-
ping defendants, as a pretext to escape principles of interna-
tional law designed to protect the individual and the surren-
dering country. The decision in United States v. Bin Laden
foretells that the international community can expect future
U.S. courts to act with the same disregard for foreign deci-
sions or opinions especially in the high profile terrorist cases.
66. 156 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
67. See id. at 363.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 364.
70. See id.
71. See Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
72. Id.
1072 [Vol. 42
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2. What Tests Should be Used to Determine Whether the
Doctrine of Specialty Has Been Violated?
When a country requests an extradition, it customarily
uses a prosecutor's or investigator's information, or a grand
jury indictment, to list the charges and facts upon which the
extradition request is based. Sometimes the prosecution
gathers additional facts after filing the extradition request,
which may occur before or after the accused has been extra-
dited. In a typical case, the prosecution could simply amend
the information to include a new charge. In an extradition
case, the extradited defendant's right to the doctrine of spe-
cialty collides with the requesting country's freedom to amend
an indictment to include additional charges against the de-
fendant.
a. Specific Request Test
This scenario is best exemplified in United States v.
Khan.73 In Khan, the defendant was indicted on charges of
conspiracy to import heroin.74 The United States requested
his extradition for these charges, and Pakistan granted the
request.7" Before he was extradited, he was convicted of an
unrelated charge in Pakistan for which he was incarcerated
for one year.76 Five years after his release from the Pakistani
jail, the United States demanded his extradition on the origi-
nal charges and Pakistan again granted the request.77 After
he was extradited, the prosecutor added the charge of using a
telephone to facilitate the commission of a drug felony, a
crime that is not punishable in Pakistan unless it is combined
with another crime.78
The Khan court acknowledged that the doctrine of spe-
cialty was incorporated into the United States-Pakistan Ex-
tradition Treaty.79 Under this doctrine, the court cautioned,
an agreement to extradite will not be inferred from silence
concerning a particular count, but rather an affirmative
statement by the surrendering country must be made as to
73. 993 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. See id. at 1370.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1371.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1372.
79. See id.
107320021
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each individual count.80 In making this statement, the court
declared, "We are not convinced that the doctrine of specialty
is satisfied under all treaties as long as the prosecution is
based on the same facts as those set forth in the request for
extradition."8 Instead of inferring consent from silence, the
court stated, "We presume, without evidence to the contrary,
that Pakistan would object to extradition on the basis of [the
superseding count] because the offense charged there is not a
crime in Pakistan."82 Under extradition treaties, the surren-
dering country has the right to refuse extradition if the
charge upon which the extradition is to be based is not a
crime in the surrendering country.83 The Khan court thus
held that the doctrine of specialty was violated unless the
surrendering country "unambiguously agreed" to extradite
the defendant on each count.84 In this case, Ib]ecause Paki-
stan did not unambiguously agree to extradite Khan on the
basis of' the subsequent count, the doctrine of specialty was
violated. 8 His conviction was reversed and dismissed.8
As Khan demonstrates, whether the requesting country
should be allowed to amend the information is a difficult
question. If a court holds that this is permissible, how closely
must the new charge relate to the original charge? As the fol-
lowing cases reveal, this has not been an easy question. The
following cases bring to light the overwhelming reluctance in
American jurisprudence to find a violation of the doctrine of
specialty and dismiss a. charge. The Khan decision is, unfor-
tunately, an exception.
b. Totality of the Circumstances Test
Most U.S. courts look to the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether there has been a violation of the doc-
trine of specialty. The rationale for analyzing the case by ex-
amining the totality of the circumstances, rather than iso-
lated incidents, facts, or agreements, is that "[t]he doctrine of
specialty, as interpreted in our law, does not call for the ex-
80. See id. at 1374.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See United States v. Bakhtiar, 964 F. Supp. 112, 113 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
84. Khan, 993 F.2d at 1374.
85. See id. at 1375.
86. Id.
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tradition crime to be handled in a vacuum. 87
There are two prongs under the totality of the circum-
stances test: (1) whether the surrendering country has ob-
jected to or would object to the prosecution of the new
charge; 8 and (2) whether the prosecution itself is based on
some evidence, facts, or acts as listed in the original request
for extradition.89 Most courts acknowledge both prongs as
part of the totality of the circumstances test; however, some
jurisdictions put greater emphasis on one, or even disregard
one in favor of the other.
i. Prong One: Would the Surrendering Country
Object?
To ascertain whether the surrendering country has ob-
jected to, or would object to, the prosecution of the new
charge, the court places itself in the position of the surrender-
ing country.9" The court determines whether the surrender-
ing country would regard the prosecution of a subsequent
charge as a breach of the extradition order.9 In fact, accord-
ing deference to the surrendering country's intentions in de-
ciding to extradite underlies the very purpose of the doctrine
of specialty.92 Some courts have held that if the surrendering
country intended to charge, or would have charged, the de-
fendant with the subsequent count, the doctrine of specialty
is not violated.93 Verifying the surrendering country's intent,
however, is a challenging task, especially if the extradition
treaty is vague or ambiguous.
To confirm the surrendering country's intent, one court
has noted that the doctrine of specialty "requires an affirma-
87. United States v. Garcia, 208 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated,
531 U.S. 1062 (2001) (citing United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir.
1995), United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991), United
States v. Rossi, 545 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1976), and United States v. Paroutian, 299
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962)).
88. See United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 835 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. b (1987)); see also United
States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
89. See Sensi, 879 F.2d at 895-96 (stating both requirements).
90. See United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983); see also United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 432 (1886).
91. See United States v. Medina, 985 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
92. See United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1987).
93. See United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1990).
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tive statement by the surrendering country of counts on
which extradition is based," and that agreement to extradite
will not be inferred from silence concerning a particular
count.94 Other jurisdictions, in determining whether the sur-
rendering country has objected to or would object to the
prosecution of the new charge, have not gone as far as Khan.
Rather than presuming the surrendering country would ob-
ject to the superseding charges, these jurisdictions seem to
have presumed consent unless there is evidence to the con-
trary.
For example, in United States v. Jetter, the defendants
were charged with "conspiracy to distribute cocaine and pos-
session with intent to distribute cocaine."95 They were ar-
rested in Costa Rica, which granted extradition.96 In its ex-
tradition ruling, Costa Rica mentioned all the requested
extraditable crimes except for conspiracy." The Jetter court
presumed the Costa Rican court meant to include the con-
spiracy charge in the extradition ruling because its opinion
did not indicate it had limited the extradition request in any
way." Without investigating the matter further, the court
held that it had jurisdiction over the defendants for the crime
of conspiracy."
In a recent case, Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, the
court stated that the main focus of the doctrine of specialty
remains on the prosecution and conduct of the defendant,
rather than on the view of the rendering country. 6° In Gallo-
Chamorro, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to im-
port, a charge which is "specifically prohibited [for] prosecu-
tion" in the surrendering country, Colombia." ' Following its
stated principle, the court found that the doctrine of specialty
was not violated, even though the defendant was convicted of
a charge that was not included in the extradition request, and
was specifically prohibited by the surrendering country, Co-
94. United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1993). No other
courts have followed Khan.
95. Jetter, 722 F.2d at 372.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 373.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
101. Id.
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lombia.'0 The court held that "even though the asylum coun-
try had specifically denied extradition on a conspiracy charge,
no specialty doctrine violation occurred when the district
court instructed the jury on co-conspirator liability under
[Pinkerton v. United States]." °3 The court agreed "that a
Pinkerton instruction.. . 'permitted the government to estab-
lish the defendant's membership in a conspiracy as an evi-
dentiary fact to prove guilt in the related substantive of-
fenses."" 4  The importance of the surrendering country's
input was dismissed in a footnote:
We are mindful that some courts and other authorities
state the test as 'whether the requested state has objected
or would object to prosecution.'. . . While this language
seems to lend importance to the view of the rendering
country, the main focus remains on the prosecution and
the conduct of the defendant.' 5
This is the same rationale used in United States v. Bin
Laden.106 If courts refuse to allow the surrendering country to
limit extradition, then the court is violating the doctrine and
degrading the respect between nations. Further, and equally
as serious, the courts are also emasculating the rights of the
extradited defendant.
The Khan case, instead of being the exception, should be
the norm. U.S. courts should look to the surrendering coun-
try for guidance at all stages of the proceeding. If the prose-
cutor discovers new facts upon which he or she would like to
charge a defendant who has already been extradited, the
prosecutor should be required, under this first prong, to dem-
onstrate two things to the court: (1) that the crime and/or
penalty exists in the surrendering country, and (2) that the
surrendering country has acquiesced to the new charges or
penalty, just as if it had for the original extradition request.
This requirement is straightforward and not unduly burden-
some on prosecutors. Further, this practice would acknowl-
edge legitimate respect for international law, relations, and
reciprocity.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 1306 (citing United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir.
1987)); see generally Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
104. Gallo-Chamorro, 233 F.3d at 1306.
105. Id. at 1306 n.20.
106. 156 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See infra Part VI.
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ii. Prong Two: Is the New Charge Based on the
Same Facts?
Almost every court deciding a doctrine of specialty issue
has analyzed whether the prosecution is based on some evi-
dence, facts, or acts as listed in the original request for extra-
dition." 7 Often, even if the superseding charge does not meet
the first prong, courts use the second prong to find there was
no violation of the doctrine of specialty. Decisions that have
concentrated on this second prong have ranged from courts
finding a violation if the facts and charges are not exactly like
those set out in the extradition request, to those courts which
would only find a violation if the superseding charges were
"totally unrelated."1 °8
The general rule is, instead of requiring exact uniformity
between the information in the extradition request and the
actual indictment, the specialty doctrine mandates that the
indictment be 'based on the same facts as those set forth in
the request for extradition."" 9 Many jurisdictions have con-
centrated on the term "separate offenses." For a crime to be
considered "separate," it need not have a different name in
each country. "[T]he appropriate test is whether the [surren-
dering or] extraditing country would consider the acts for
which the defendant was prosecuted as independent from
those for which the defendant was extradited... ,, 10
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. a; see also United States v. Cabrera Sarmiento, 659
F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that attempted arms sale to terrorist groups-allegedly
described by the U.S. to Bermudian authorities-was of the same character as
the conspiracies to sell and transfer American-made defense articles to a puta-
tive Iranian buyer with which the defendants had been charged).
108. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962).
109. Gallo-Chamorro, 233 F.3d at 1305 (quoting United States v. Sensi, 879
F.2d 888, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 1989), in turn citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. a (1987)).
110. See United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
Paroutian, 299 F.2d at 491); see also United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974
(1987); United States v. Levy, 947 F.2d 1032 (1991) (stating that it is necessary
to look at totality of the circumstances); United States v. Sturtz, 648 F. Supp.
817, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[Tlhe general character of the crime for which the
fugitive was extradited is used to determine whether the superseding indict-
ment adds a separate offense."). The Sturtz court noted that a "fundamental
concern of the principle of specialty was that persons who were surrendered
should not be subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving govern-
ment, especially for political crimes." Sturtz, 648 F. Supp. at 819.
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For example, in United States v. Andonian, the defendant
was extradited from Uruguay to face charges of money laun-
dering.111 After the defendant was extradited, the prosecutor
filed a new indictment that listed additional facts and counts
that were only "roughly parallel" to the original extraditable
charge." The Andonian court followed the Second Circuit
case of United States v. Paroutian."' The Paroutian case took
the term "separate offenses" to its extreme, remarking that
only a "totally unrelated" offense would violate the doctrine of
specialty.' In Paroutian, both the original and the supersed-
ing indictments contained charges of narcotics trafficking, but
the later indictment, issued in another district, included two
counts not covered in the original indictment."' The Ando-
nian court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit case, Khan,
which held that it is not sufficient that the new charge be
based on the same facts that the original charged but rather,
the surrendering country must "unambiguously agree" to
each count."6 The Andonian court found that the new counts
were not based on a "separate offense," and held that there
was no violation of the doctrine of specialty.
Combining the explanations "independent" and "sepa-
rate" with "totally unrelated," a number of courts in the
United States will find a violation of the doctrine of specialty
only if an additional charge or indictment is based on a com-
pletely isolated fact or occurrence. Yet, Rauscher anticipated
this conundrum in 1886. That decision pronounced that a
country could not evade the doctrine of specialty by listing a
greater charge in the extradition request and then prosecut-
ing a lesser charge that was not so listed."7 The Court held
that the defendant, who was extradited on the charge of mur-
der, could not be prosecuted for the lesser offense of "cruel
and unusual punishment.""8 Although the charge was based
on the same facts, it was separate and therefore prohibited by
the doctrine of specialty."9 This was true even though the
111. United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir.1994).
112. Id.
113. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
114. Id. at 490-91.
115. See id. at 491.
116. Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1436.
117. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 432 (1886).
118. See id.
119. See id.
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new charge was lesser than the original charge.' Hence, in
light of Rauscher, separate offense should mean any separate
charge, whether or not it arises out of the same offense.
An excellent example of a decision that followed in the
footsteps of Rauscher and found the new charge constituted a
separate offense is a Washington Supreme Court case, State
v. Pang.1"' In Pang, the defendant was extradited to the
United States from Brazil to face charges of arson. 12  Once in
the United States, the prosecuting attorney attempted to
charge the defendant with capital murder for the deaths of
the individuals who died in the fire. 12' The court found that
Article XXI of the United States-Brazilian Extradition Treaty
specifically limited the possible charges to only those "which
gave rise to the request."'24 The court held that the murder
charge was a separate offense, and the doctrine of specialty
was thereby violated.'
Unfortunately, Pang is one of the few cases in which a
court found a violation of the doctrine of specialty."' Most ig-
nore precedent and circumvent this prong of the test. Some
have even gone so far as to look at the "nature of the offenses,
rather than the different facts alleged in support of the of-
fenses." 7 Consequently, the overwhelming majority of cases
have refused to find a violation of the doctrine of specialty.'
120. See id.
121. 940 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1997).
122. See id. at 1030.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. The only other cases where courts found such a violation were United
States v. McDonald and United States v. Khan. See United States v. McDonald,
172 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (stating that additional charges
against the defendant were dismissed because the surrendering country had not
granted extradition as to those charges); United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1369,
1374 (9th Cir. 1993).
127. See United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 1991).
128. See generally Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.
2000); United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding additional count permissible be-
cause it was based on the original extraditable charge); United States v. Tse,
135 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Extradition of Lahoria, 932 F. Supp. 802
(N.D. Tex. 1996); United States v. Jurado-Rodriguez, 907 F. Supp. 568
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Marconi, 899 F. Supp. 458 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that the addi-
tional count did not "materially alter[ ] the substance of the offense for which
Puentes ha[d] been extradited."); United States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502
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3. Does the Extradited Defendant Have Standing to
Claim a Violation of the Doctrine of Specialty?
One of the chief problems with the doctrine of specialty is
determining who has the power to invoke, challenge or waive
it. Courts have disagreed as to whether an extradited crimi-
nal defendant has standing to raise a claim that the doctrine
of specialty has been violated. Standing decisions fall into
three categories: (1) cases holding that an extradited defen-
dant has unlimited standing to raise a violation of the doc-
trine of specialty claim; (2) cases holding that an extradited
defendant has limited standing; and (3) cases holding that an
extradited defendant has no standing whatsoever.
A minority of cases falls into the first category. The
Tenth Circuit has held that an extradited defendant has
standing to claim that the doctrine of specialty was violated.
"[T]he dispute over [whether it was the surrendering country
or else the defendant] who raised the objection is irrele-
vant. ,,129
The next two categories of cases are divided evenly. The
second category of cases arises in jurisdictions that have
granted an extradited defendant limited standing. These ju-
risdictions have held that "the protection afforded by the doc-
trine of specialty exists only to the extent that the surrender-
ing country wishes."3 ° Under this line of cases, an extradited
individual may raise only those objections the surrendering
country would have raised.' An extradited defendant's
(11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that superseding in-
dictment did not violate the doctrine of specialty, even though the extradition
request contained fewer counts and less facts than the superseding indictment);
United States v. Quiceno De La Pava, 1993 WL 50943 (N.D. Ill.); St. Paul Sur-
plus Lines Ins. Co. v. Davis, 983 F.2d 1057, 1993 WL 3064 (4th Cir. Jan. 8,
1993) (unpublished opinion).
129. United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 1991) (cit-
ing United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990).
130. Sandhu v. Burke, 2000 WL 191707, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000)
(quoting United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061,
1064 (9th Cir. 1998).
131. See United States v. Nosov, 153 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "the
person extradited may raise whatever objections the rendering country might
have"); United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Puentes,
50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995) ("We hold that a criminal defendant has
108120021
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standing is limited because the objective of the doctrine of
specialty is to ensure that the contracting parties-the re-
questing and surrendering countries-faithfully observe the
treaty.132 Although this position expressly limits the rights of
the extradited defendants, these courts justify such a limita-
tion because it preserves the contractual, and hence diplo-
matic, relationship between the two countries.
The final category of cases has granted standing on this
issue only to the surrendering country; the extradited defen-
dant has no standing whatsoever.133 These cases have rea-
soned that as "a matter of international law, the principle of
specialty has been viewed as a privilege of the asylum state,
designed to protect its dignity and interests, rather than a
right accruing to the accused."134
This last line of cases, limiting standing to the surrender-
ing country, is particularly vexing because most foreign coun-
tries are reluctant to file or appear in domestic criminal
cases. The surrendering country's preferred method of ad-
dressing such an issue would be diplomatic communication
with the U.S. State Department. There, the surrendering
country likely will receive a diplomatic response claiming that
the separation of powers in the U.S. federal and independent
standing to allege a violation of the principle of specialty. We limit, however,
the defendant's challenges ... to only those objections that the rendering coun-
try might have brought.").
132. See United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir. 1989).
133. "Only an offended nation can complain about the purported violation of
an extradition treaty." United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir.
1989); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated on
other grounds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896,
902 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that "absent protest or objection by the offended sov-
ereign, [a defendant] has no standing to raise violation of [an extradition treaty]
as an issue."); United States ex rel. Cabrera v. Warden, Metro. Corr. Ctr., 629 F.
Supp. 699, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp.
1253, 1264 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Courts have recognized that the doctrine is a privi-
lege of the asylum state, not the individual right of one accused of a crime."); see
also In re Extradition of Sandhu, 886 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United
States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 1994); Kaiser v. Rutherford, 827 F.
Supp. 832, 835 (D.C.C. 1993); United States v. Quiceno De La Pava, 1993 WL
50943, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1993); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d
255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is well established that individuals have no stand-
ing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest by
the sovereigns involved."). But cf. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424
(1886) (referring to doctrine of specialty as "the right conferred upon persons
brought from a foreign country").
134. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation omit-
ted).
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state jurisdictions prevents the State Department from com-
pelling the State to enforce the extradition agreement. While
the State Department may share the concerns of the surren-
dering country, it also will contend that it is powerless to pro-
vide legitimate relief. The result is that the terms of extradi-
tion would be rendered meaningless.
4. Can the Doctrine of Specialty Be Waived?
The majority of jurisdictions have held that the doctrine
of specialty "is a right that belongs to the country that au-
thorized extradition.., and it may be waived by that na-
tion."'35 The accepted rule is that the doctrine of specialty ap-
plies unless the protection is expressly waived.' For
example, in Tse v. United States, the defendant was extra-
dited to the United States from Hong Kong.'37 The American
defense attorney advised Tse that he could plead guilty be-
cause the doctrine of specialty barred additional counts from
being charged against him.'38 At the time the defense attor-
ney made these statements, Hong Kong had not indicated
that it would waive the doctrine of specialty.'39 Tse relied on
his counsel's advice and pled guilty.4 The court found that
the plea was given without informed consent; Tse withdrew
his plea and the case proceeded to trial.' The Consul Gen-
eral of the United States immediately asked Hong Kong for
permission to prosecute Tse on additional charges.' Hong
Kong consented, thereby waiving the doctrine of specialty."4
Because Hong Kong waived the doctrine of specialty, Tse lost
his standing to claim a violation of the doctrine. He was
prosecuted and convicted on every charge. '44
Tse demonstrates the inherent problem in allowing a sur-
135. United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (M.D. Fla.
1987); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1994).
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. b; United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1574
(11th Cir. 1995).
137. Tse v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194 (D. Mass. 2000).
138. See id. at 193-94.
139. See id. at 194.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 191.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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rendering country alone to waive the doctrine. If a surrender-
ing country waives the doctrine, the extradited individual
loses his individual right to challenge a doctrine of specialty
violation. This practice puts the extradited individual at the
mercy of the surrendering country's government.
In justifying such a result, courts have proffered that be-
cause international comity is a guiding principle behind the
doctrine of specialty, the surrendering country-and not the
extradited individual-has the right to waive its applica-
tion.45 Courts have further submitted that the doctrine of
specialty, as previously mentioned, is "a privilege of the asy-
lum state, designed to protect the interest of the asylum
state, and is not a right accruing to the accused."4" Since this
is the view of most U.S. courts, surrendering countries must
begin to take responsibility for the defendants they extradite
if they wish to oppose the addition of death penalty counts af-
ter the extradited individual is in a U.S. jurisdiction.
IV. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: A
PARALLEL RIGHT TO THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY
The United States ratified the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations ("VCCR") in 1969.' The purpose of the
Convention was to "codify the rights and obligations of mem-
ber states with respect to consular relations."'48 The VCCR
provides that "consular officials shall be free to communicate
with, and have access to, their nationals at all times," and
vice versa.'49 Consular officials have the unlimited right to
correspond with and visit the detained national, and to ar-
range for legal representation.5 ° This right to unrestricted
communication between consular officials and foreign nation-
als is especially important when a foreign national is arrested
145. See United States v. Medina, 985 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
146. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation omit-
ted); see also Sandhu v. Burke, 2000 WL 191707, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000).
147. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter VCCR]; see Kari Converse, Representing Non-
Citizens in Death Penalty Cases, Presentation at the National Legal Aid & De-
fense Association's Life in the Balance Symposium (Mar. 3-6, 2001).
148. William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAVL L. 257, 259
(1998).
149. Id.
150. See VCCR, supra note 147, art. 36(1)(c); see also Aceves, supra note 148,
at 259.
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while abroad; in such a situation, the VCCR provides un-
equivocally that the proper authorities must immediately in-
form the detained foreign national of his right to have the
consulate contacted without delay if the national so desires.'
The police and prosecutors are charged with this responsibil-
ity.
If the United States fails to abide by the VCCR, a defen-
dant may raise this issue to seek relief.' To have an issue on
appeal, the defendant must prove three factors: (1) that he
did not know of the VCCR rights; (2) that he would have
availed himself of his rights under the VCCR if he had known
about them; and (3) that he suffered prejudice by not availing
himself of his VCCR rights.5 ' No federal U.S. court to date
has honored the language or intent of the VCCR by issuing a
ruling resulting in suppression of certain evidence or dis-
missal of the case, even where all of the above requirements
were clearly met.'
There are several prime examples of U.S. courts eviscer-
ating the individual international rights intended under the
VCCR. One of the most flagrant violations of the VCCR was
the case of the LaGrand brothers. Karl and Walter LaGrand
were German nationals sentenced to death in Arizona after
being convicted of murder during an attempted robbery in
1982.15 Neither brother received the proper notifications re-
quired under the VCCR."6 When the case came to the atten-
tion of the German government, a number of legal and diplo-
matic steps were taken to halt the pending executions. '
Unfortunately, no court allowed the VCCR to be a basis for
staying the pending executions and the Arizona Governor re-
buffed all pleas by the German government with tacit ap-
151. VCCR, supra note 147, art. 36(1)(b); see also Aceves, supra note 148, at
259.
152. See Converse, supra note 147.
153. See id.
154. But see State of Delaware v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 14 (Del. 1999) (suppress-
ing a confession on precisely these grounds).
155. See Amnesty International USA, USA-Execution of Foreign National
Continues, DEATH PENALTY NEWS (Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.orgabolish/1999/foreignexec.html; see also Cassel, su-
pra note 2.
156. See Amnesty International USA, supra note 155.
157. See Arizona to Execute German Despite International Pleas, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 3, 1999, 1999 WL 2556785 [hereinafter Arizona to Exe-
cute German].
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proval of the U.S. Secretary of State."8  On February 24,
1998, Karl LaGrand was executed by lethal injection. Less
than a month later, on March 3rd, his brother Walter was
executed in the gas chamber."9
After Karl's execution, but before Walter's, the German
government petitioned the International Court of Justice
("ICJ")6° for a stay of execution pending a full hearing. 6' The
ICJ granted the German request for a stay and specifically
sought assurance from the United States that Walter would
not be executed until the ICJ had an opportunity to have a
full hearing on the alleged violations of the VCCR."'6 The
United States and the State of Arizona, however, rejected the
ICJ request.'
Subsequently, Germany lodged a full complaint with the
ICJ, contending that Arizona never advised the LaGrand
brothers of their rights under the VCCR.'64 After extensive
briefing and oral argument, the ICJ ruled that
[flirst,. . . individuals have rights under the treaty.
Second, when governments fail to notify detained for-
eigners of their consular rights without delay, courts may
not later tell them they are too late when they belatedly
claim violations of consular rights.
And third, if a foreigner not notified of consular rights is
sentenced to a "severe penalty"-death or lengthy impris-
onment-courts must review and reconsider the conviction
and sentence. 65
The U.S. courts ignored the World Court decision and con-
tinue to do so today. 6
In Texas, the situation of foreign nationals on death row
158. See id.
159. See Amnesty International USA, supra note 155.
160. The ICJ is also referred to as the World Court.
161. See Arizona to Execute German, supra note 157.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Amnesty International USA, supra note 155; see also Cassel, supra
note 2.
165. See Cassel, supra note 2; see also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001
I.C.J. No. 104 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-
cij.orgicjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
166. Amnesty International USA, supra note 155; see also Cassel, supra note
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is more acute than in any other state.67 For instance, three
cases--Santana v. State,'68 Faulder v. State,'6 s and Fierro v.
State'°--involve foreign nationals who were sentenced to
death after being convicted of murder. In all of these cases,
the foreign defendants were denied their right to consular ac-
cess under the VCCR.' They did not know such rights ex-
isted.' 2 The authorities never informed them of these rights
and never contacted the appropriate consular officials. 7 '
Santana, a Dominican Republic national, was executed in
1993.14 The Canadian, Faulder, was executed in 1999. Fi-
erro, a forty-six year old Mexican national, is still on death
row in Texas, notwithstanding strong evidence regarding his
innocence. This year marks his twenty-third year on death
175
row.
Despite public outcry-both on an international and na-
tional level-the majority of recent "U.S. court decisions on
consular rights do not even mention the World Court [deci-
sion in the LaGrand Case]. None rely on it." 176 This is fright-
ening when approximately 118 foreign citizens of thirty-four
nationalities are under a death sentence in the United
States. 177 Since 1993, at least fifteen foreign nationals have
been executed in the United States without ever having been
notified of their rights under the VCCR. 178 Even today, as the
number of VCCR violations are still increasing, U.S. courts
show no inclination of respecting international law when
167. See generally S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's
Death Row and the Right of Access to a Consul, Symposium: Human Rights in
the Americas, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719 (1995).
168. 714 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
169. 745 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
170. 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
171. See Shank & Quigley, supra note 167, at 722-27.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 722.
175. See Amnesty International USA, supra note 155. A list of pending exe-
cutions is maintained by Rick Halperin at http://web.cis.smu.edu/~deathpen.
176. See Cassel, supra note 2.
177. This information is maintained at the Death Penalty Information Cen-
ter Web site at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/foreignnatl.html#REPORTED
DEATH-SENTENCED (last updated Apr. 11, 2002).
178. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A TIME FOR
ACTION - PROTECTING THE CONSULAR RIGHTS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FACING
THE DEATH PENALTY (2001), available at
http://www.web.amnesty.orgai.nsf/recent/AMR5110 6 2001.
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faced with the politics of the death penalty.
V. WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE UNITED STATES WHEN THE
DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY STANDS TO LIMIT A DESIRE TO
SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY
The issue of capital punishment in the United States is
so emotional and always wrapped in the disturbing facts of
the individual crime, that seldom does a court give full con-
sideration to any doctrine which will limit or restrict the use
of the death penalty. In the United States, thirty-eight states
retain the death penalty.179 Unfortunately, a growing number
of executions ignore "international cries for mercy." 8 The
question arises, "[wihy does the world's wealthiest country,
the self-appointed guardian of human rights outside its bor-
ders; allow this most inhuman of punishments to continue?"'81
The answer, simply put, is political expediency.
The political reality in the United States is that courts
and individual judges feel powerless when confronted with
the crowd mentality pressure to impose the death penalty.
The "policy of death" in the United States "keeps the victims
of terrible tragedy on puppet strings operated by prosecutors,
politicians and victims rights groups. They are paraded out
and danced before the media in order to maintain a climate of
rage and support for executions.""'8 Ken Shulman eloquently
commented on the American "death community":
It bears remembering that the plaintiff in a criminal suit
is not the family of the victim, but the people of the com-
monwealth. Our justice system does not exist to barter
revenge or blood lust. It exists to uphold the law, without
which our society cannot function. The death penalty
subverts that law. And not only in the sanctioning of
homicide. Due process is compromised in a myriad ways,
by elected officials pandering to the voting public with
stepped up executions, by prosecutors avid enough to con-
ceal evidence in order to wrest yet one more death convic-
tion from a jury.'83
179. See Death Penalty Information Center Web site, supra note 177.
180. OLIVIERO TOsCANI, BENETTON, WE, ON DEATH Row, 5-6 (2000).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 7-8.
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However, this "culture of death ' is increasingly subject
to political criticism from the international community. Pub-
lic opinion abroad, particularly in Europe, is strongly opposed
to the imposition of the death penalty in the United States
and elsewhere.'85 "The European Union and the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) have both called
for a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty; and the
forty-one member Council of Europe has made abolition of the
death penalty a condition of membership." 8 ' In South Africa,
the death penalty was declared unconstitutional in 1995.187
In Canada, the death penalty was removed from the criminal
code in 1976.188 The Mexican Constitution takes this concept
even further; it forbids the death penalty as well as prison
sentences over forty years.'88 Just recently, in the summer of
2001, Chile and Ireland both abolished the death penalty, al-
though neither country had resorted to capital punishment in
years."'
The private sector is also putting pressure on the United
States. European companies, responding to public opinion in
Europe, have begun expressing their concerns to political fig-
ures in the United States.' For example, in 1998 "a visiting
representative of the European Parliament warned Texas's
[then] governor, George W. Bush that European companies
were under pressure from public opinion and their sharehold-
ers to withhold investments in states that use the death pen-
184. Phrase coined by Pope John Paul II, the "Millennial Pope" in a speech
given on January 26, 1999, in St. Louis, Missouri. A transcript of this speech is
available at http://www.etn.com/jp99/words-prze.htm.
185. See Sue Bailey, High Court Judgment Protects Canadians and Others
Facing Death Penalty, CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 15, 2001, 2001 WL 12576255; see
also Mary L. Dudziak, Giving Capital Offense: How America's Addiction to the
Ultimate Punishment is Undercutting its Criticism of Injustice in Other Coun-
tries, 52 CIVILIZATION 57 (October/November 2000). According Derechos Hu-
man Rights, an international organization dedicated to the promotion of human
rights, other countries that still impose the death penalty are Japan, China,
Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and India. For additional infor-
mation, see the Web site maintained by Derechos Human Rights at
http://www.derechos.org/dp/#facts.
186. Dudziak, supra note 185.
187. Id.
188. See Bailey, supra note 185.
189. See Tim Weiner, Extraditions Are Limited By A Ruling In Mexico, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at A9, available at LEXIS, News Library, N.Y. Times file.
190. For additional background sources of information, see the Death Penalty
Information Center Web site, cited supra note 177.
191. See Dudziak, supra note 185.
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alty.' ' 9' This obviously did not change now-President Bush's
own opinion regarding the death penalty.
This clash of opinions regarding the death penalty is
heightened when these two worlds collide in extradition pro-
ceedings. In the past, extradition has been a fairly affable
and simple process. Yet, with growing international support
for ending the death penalty, foreign countries have gained
confidence in insisting on a "no death penalty" provision in
agreements to extradite a defendant.9 ' In light of the afore-
mentioned facts, it is fair to argue that foreign governments
can reasonably expect several things from the United States
regarding future extraditions, especially if there is any con-
nection to acts of terrorism.
First, foreign governments can anticipate extradition re-
quests without a full disclosure of the potential charges facing
the sought individual. This has already occurred in the case
of Lotfi Raissi, the twenty-seven year old Algerian pilot who
recently appeared in London's Belmarsh Magistrates Court.94
Raissi faces extradition to the United States on essentially
two minor charges of making a false statement to the Federal
Aviation Administration, and was held in custody because of
suspected terrorist links to the World Trade Center attack.'9
The United States is not going to obtain Raissi and then try
him in the United States for only the false statements. Along
these lines, Great Britain must insist on a specific "no death
penalty extradition" agreement if the extradition request ex-
pressly seeks to try Raissi for the World Trade Center at-
tacks. The country must seek this provision under European
Union law.'96
In Raissi, Great Britain is either going to have to go
along with this charade (perhaps a face-saving ploy), or step
up and insist on a "no death provision," even where the
charges do not warrant more than five years in prison. '97 A
demand for "no death penalty" in the face of such a minor
charge raises the uncomfortable subtext of distrust in a dip-
192. Id.
193. See infra Part VI.
194. See Terrorist Suspect Sobs in the Dock; War on Terror, SCOTTISH DAILY
REC., Jan. 12, 2002, at 23, 2002 WL 3278154.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
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lomatic community where trust is currency."'
Second, foreign governments can expect U.S. courts to
ignore their communiques and legal opinions interpreting the
foreign countries' own laws and policies. An example of this
is United States v. Bin Laden.'99 In Bin Laden, Khalfan Mo-
hamed was arrested in connection with the bombings of the
American Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and in
Nairobi, Kenya. °° He was charged in the United States for
murder, conspiracy and an attack on a United States facil-
ity."' Shortly thereafter, Mohamed was found in South Af-
rica, where he was interrogated by South African police and
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. ' He confessed to
being part of the plot for the embassy bombings, and was de-
ported, literally overnight, to the United States.0 ' The South
African government acquiesced to the deportation.0 4
Before trial began in the United States, Mohamed's at-
torneys brought an action in South Africa in the Cape of Good
Hope High Court, requesting that the government intervene
on behalf of Mohamed to demand that the United States not
seek the death penalty. ' In May 2001 the Constitutional
Court of South Africa ruled that its government erred when it
allowed Mohamed to be extradited to the United States to
face charges for which he could be sentenced to death if con-
victed. 26 The basis for the ruling was that the death penalty
was declared unconstitutional in South Africa in 1995.207 The
author of the South African opinion, Arthur Chaskalson,
wrote, "The rights in issue here are the right to human dig-
nity, the right to life and the right not to be treated or pun-
ished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way."0 8 The South
198. Based on a lack of evidence, Raissi has since been released from custody
by British officials. See LOS ANGELES TIMES SINDICATE INTERNATIONAL, avail-
able at http://www.latsi.com/oneshots/ATTACK/n-021302.htm.
199. 156 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
200. See id. at 362.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 362-63.
203. See id. at 363.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. See SA Should Have Protected Mohamed-ConCourt, S. AFR. PRESS
ASS'N, May 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL22184994 [hereinafter ConCourt].
207. See Dudziak, supra note 185.
208. Mohamed v. President of the RSA, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 $ 37 (CC); see
also ConCourt, supra note 206.
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African government had a duty, the court held, to receive as-
surance from U.S. officials that Mohamed would not face the
death penalty. °9
To bolster its point, the court drew a correlation with the
case involving a second alleged embassy bomber, Mahmoud
Mahmud Salim."' Salim was found in Germany after the
embassy bombings.21' Germany agreed to extradite Salim,
but not before receiving an assurance from the United States
government that he would not receive the death penalty for
any charge." The South African Court held that its govern-
ment-like the German government-had a duty to demand
such an assurance; it violated that duty when it allowed Mo-
hamed to be deported without assuring his life would be
spared.
The response in the United States to the South African
decision was despicable. The South African Court's decision
was rendered one day before the jury in the United States re-
turned its verdict. 2"' The United States was quick to ac-
knowledge the judgment. In speaking for the Department of
Foreign Affairs and the Justice Department, Ronnie Ma-
moepa said each department "reiterates its respect for the de-
cision of the Constitutional Court on this matter."14 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York did not share that same respect.
After the South African Court's decision was rendered,
Mohamed brought a motion requesting that the United States
government be precluded from seeking the death penalty, or
in the alternative, that the South African Court's decision at
least be considered as a mitigating factor."5 The district court
denied the first request."6 It found that the American offi-
cials in Mohamed's deportation acted in good faith, as the ex-
tradition treaty in place at the time of his arrest did not
specifically permit the South African government to condition
an extradition.2 7 The court noted that the current South Afri-
209. See Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 37.
210. See id. T[ 44.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
214. ConCourt, supra note 206.
215. See Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 361-62.
216. See id. at 362.
217. See id. at 366.
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can-United States Extradition Treaty, which provided that
"'the Requested State may refuse extradition unless the Re-
questing State provides assurances that the death penalty
will not be imposed, or if imposed, will not be carried out,"'
was ratified after Mohamed's extradition.218 The prior Extra-
dition Treaty was silent on a surrendering country's right to
place assurances on extradition requests.2 19 The court admit-
ted, however, that the United States had on several occasions
granted such requests. ' Hence, the court implied that the
South African government waived this silent, yet implicit,
right at the time of deportation.2 2' Because this right was not
expressly included in the Extradition Treaty, the court re-
fused to reconsider the issue.
This misguided attempt to sidestep an international deci-
sion communicating a country's intent was contemptible.
Even in 1886, the Rauscher Court acknowledged that it was
"unreasonable" for the requesting country to be able to prose-
cute the extradited defendant "without any limitation, im-
plied or otherwise."222 The Bin Laden court did permit the
jury to consider, during the penalty phase, the South African
Court's decision as a mitigating factor.2 3 After two days of
deliberations, the jurors were "unable to reach a unanimous
verdict."224 Mohamed was sentenced to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole.
The Bin Laden case is a good example of the steps that a
surrendering government must take in order to preserve the
rights of extradited defendants. It proves how important it is
for countries to draft very specific language in their extradi-
tion treaties, especially when it comes to the death penalty.
The Bin Laden court reiterated that it need not discontinue
the capital case against Mohamed simply because there was
no express provision in the extradition treaty that allowed a
surrendering country to condition an extradition or deporta-
218. Id. at 366 n.10 (quoting the South African-United States Extradition
Treaty).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 365-66.
222. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1886).
223. Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 367-68.
224. Id. at 371.
225. See id.
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tion request."' The court found that such express language
was required, even while acknowledging that the United
States had acceded to conditions on extradition or deportation
requests in other cases.22
Any country opposed to the death penalty should take
steps to amend its extradition treaty with the United States
to clearly state that no extradition will be allowed without as-
surances that the death penalty will not be imposed. In the
meantime, foreign governments opposed to the death penalty
should immediately require a standard no death penalty as-
surance in every extradition document, regardless of how mi-
nor the crime or charge in the extradition request appears.
This avoids the diplomatic complications inherent in a spe-
cific case request, while at the same time closes a significant
doctrine of specialty loophole in U.S. domestic law.
Third, absent an express assurance of no death penalty,
foreign governments also can expect U.S. prosecutors to
amend the charges or file new charges once an extradited in-
dividual is under the authority of a U.S. jurisdiction. While
Pang would lead one to expect that other courts would not
permit the addition of a death count, history tells us that
Pang type decisions are rare and seldom followed.228 The far
greater number of courts have found exceptions to allow addi-
tional charges, and in the emotionally charged atmosphere
surrounding the attacks on September 11, 2001, it is unreal-
istic to believe a U.S. court will recognize the doctrine of spe-
cialty in such cases. Once that door is opened, however justi-
fied it may seem in the terrorist cases, it will quickly become
the law in the United States to ignore extradition agreement
restrictions in any potential capital case.
VI. ESCAPING THE PROBLEMS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
SPECIALTY ALTOGETHER-WHAT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
SHOULD Do BEFORE AGREEING TO ANY EXTRADITION TO
THE UNITED STATES
A. Extradition with Written Assurances
Foreign governments must refuse to extradite an indi-
226. See id. at 365-67.
227. See id. at 366 n.10.
228. The Rauscher and Khan decisions are unique in this respect.
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vidual until they first receive a written assurance that the
death penalty will not be imposed. A prime example is a re-
cent Mexican Supreme Court case. In October 2001, the
Mexican Supreme Court issued a ruling that declared uncon-
stitutional the extradition of an accused into the United
States for any capital offense. 29 The Mexican Constitution
states that every individual is capable of rehabilitation.2!"
Hence, no defendant extradited from Mexico to the United
States can receive a sentence greater than forty years (sixty
years for extreme cases), and certainly no death penalty.23' In
just two months, the ruling "has stopped the extradition of
more than 70 high-profile defendants."' 2 The consequence of
this ruling is that prosecutors in the United States are forced
to either reduce the sentences extradited defendants receive,
or not prosecute the defendants at all. 3'
The second most recent example of "extradition with as-
surances" is from the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1994,
Atif Rafay and Glen Sebastian Burns murdered Rafay's par-
ents in Bellevue, Washington. After the murder, they fled to
Canada. Prosecutors in Washington requested extradition.234
Following extensive appeals, the Supreme Court of Canada
ruled that the criminal defendants in Canada may not be ex-
tradited to the United States if they face a death penalty eli-
gible offense.235 The court held that "assurances [that prose-
cutors will not seek the death penalty] are constitutionally
required in all but exceptional cases."236
As the Canadian and Mexican cases illustrate, the
United States is now sandwiched between two countries that
have abolished the death penalty, and that have affirmatively
established they will no longer extradite potential capital de-
fendants to the United States without expressed assurances
that the death penalty will not be imposed.
229. See Weiner, supra note 189.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. Bailey, supra note 185.
235. See id.
236. Id.
20021 1095
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
B. Refuse to Waive or Acquiesce to a Violation of the Doctrine
of Specialty
Foreign governments also must refuse to consent to a
waiver of the doctrine of specialty, and they must not acqui-
esce to a violation of the doctrine of specialty in any case. As
the Tse court demonstrated, if a surrendering country waives
the doctrine, the extradited individual loses his individual
right to challenge a doctrine of specialty violation."7 This
practice puts the extradited individual at the mercy of the
surrendering country's government or worse, the locally-
elected prosecutor and judge.
C. Communication
As the Bin Laden case demonstrates, attorneys for an ex-
tradited defendant must take steps to communicate with the
surrendering country. Defense attorneys must make their
clients aware of their rights under both the VCCR and the
doctrine of specialty. This is especially true in countries that
still enforce the death penalty. In Mohamed's case, but for
his attorneys bringing an action in South Africa, the South
African government's error would have never been brought to
light. Although the South African Court's decision was not
completely respected in Mohamed's case, one can argue it is a
significant factor in his serving a life sentence instead of wait-
ing on death row.
VII. CONCLUSION
The biggest problem with the doctrine of specialty is that
it has been severely limited by U.S. court decisions. Decisions
by prosecutors and rulings by courts are subject to public and
political pressure. Nowhere in U.S. jurisprudence is this
more true than in death penalty litigation. The problems in-
herent in U.S. court decisions regarding extradition and the
doctrine of specialty are numerous. Couple this with the will-
ingness of U.S. courts to ignore or breach international law,
such as the VCCR, and the surrendering state, along with the
extradited defendant, have little left to protect their rights.
The United States has not demonstrated that it can be
trusted to honor the intent or wishes of a foreign government
237. See supra Part III.B.4.
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once a death eligible defendant is in U.S. custody. The doc-
trine of specialty provides a powerful tool for foreign govern-
ments to prevent an individual found in their jurisdiction
from being sentenced to death after extradition to the United
States. This tool will be effective only if foreign governments
are unequivocal and unyielding in requiring written assur-
ance of no death penalty in every extradition and are pre-
pared to appear in U.S. domestic courts to defend their inter-
national rights. For our hypothetical defendant, Carlos
Pravia, current law in both Texas and the Fifth Circuit indi-
cates that his only hope would be for the Mexican government
to bring a legal action on his behalf.

